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Paying for Permanence: Public Preferences for Contaminated Site
Cleanup
Summary
We use conjoint choice questions to investigate people’s preferences for income and
reductions in mortality risks delivered by contaminated site remediation policies. Our
survey is self-administered using the computer by residents of four cities in Italy with
severely contaminated sites. We estimate the Value of a Statistical Life to be about €5.6
million for an immediate risk reduction. If the risk reduction takes place 20 years from
now, however, the implied VSL is about €1.26 million. The discount rate implicit in the
responses to the conjoint choice questions is about 7%. People are willing to pay for
permanent risk reductions, but not just any amount. Risk reductions in the nearer future
are valued more highly than risk reductions in the more distant future. We also find that
the VSL is “individuated,” in the sense that it depends on observable individual
characteristics of the respondents, familiarity with contaminated sites, concern about the
health effects of exposure to toxicants, having a family member with cancer, perceived
usefulness of possible government actions, and the respondent’s beliefs about the goals
of government remediation programs. Additional questions suggest that respondents
discount lives, and do so at a discount rate in the ballpark of that implicit in their risk v.
money tradeoffs.
Keywords: Value of a Statistical Life, Latent Risk Reductions, Individual Discount
Rates, Conjoint Choice Questions, Contaminated Sites, Remediation
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Paying for Permanence:
Public Preferences for Contaminated Site Cleanup
by
Anna Alberini, Stefania Tonin, Margherita Turvani and Aline Chiabai

1. Introduction and Motivation
Many environmental programs require the agency in charge to set emissions or
ambient quality standards. In the case of programs addressing contaminated sites, key
decisions involve (i) to what extent pollution must be removed from soil, the subsurface
and groundwater in order to protect human health, and (ii) whether contaminants should
be removed, as opposed to implementing remedies that simply prevent human exposure
to contaminants and/or off-site migration of the polluting substances in the short term.
These are serious challenges in the U.S. Superfund program and in similar programs in
other countries.
Clearly, it would useful to compare the (monetized) value of more permanent
reductions in the risks to human health with the costs of treating contaminated soil,
groundwater and surface water. Doing so requires finding out how much the beneficiaries
of these risk reductions are willing to pay to obtain them.
Because contaminated sites often entail exposure to carcinogens and other
toxicants with long-term effects on health, the reductions in risks to human health
delivered by remediation must be paid for now but are accrued in the future. It is thus of
interest to find out if the willingness to pay for risk reductions is affected by such a delay
(“lag”), and, if so by how much. In this paper, we focus on the risks of dying associated
with exposure to contaminants at hazardous waste sites and use conjoint choice questions
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(Hanley et al., 2001) to answer this question and to explore people’s preferences for
permanent remediation, and hence permanent risk reductions. We then illustrate the use
of this approach with a sample selected to be representative of the residents of four cities
in Italy with significant contaminated site problems.
We ask three related questions. First, how much are people willing to pay for each
unit of mortality risk reduction? In other words, what is the public’s Value of a Statistical
Life (VSL) that should be used for computing the benefits of contaminated site policies
that save lives? Second, do people favor permanent cleanup policies, and are they willing
to pay more for longer-lasting risk reductions? Third, what is the effect on willingness to
pay of delaying the beginning of the mortality risk reductions?
Although the concept of VSL is reasonably well accepted in academic and policy
circles, and the VSL has been estimated using a variety of approaches,1 there is
surprisingly little empirical evidence about what VSL should be used in the context of
contaminated site remediation. Gayer et al. apply the hedonic pricing approach to homes
sold in the vicinity of Superfund sites in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and estimate the value
of a statistical case of cancer is $3.9-4.6 million (1996 dollars) (Gayer et al., 2000) or
$4.3-8.3 million (Gayer et al., 2002). These values rely on specific assumptions about
people’s subjectively assessed risks and about how they change in response to the release
of information by the agency.
Recent

research

(e.g.,

Chilton

et

al.,

2002;

Tsuge

et

al.,

2005;

Vassanadumrongdee and Matsuoka, 2005) has examined the effects of risk perceptions—
such as dread, degree of voluntariness, etc. (Fischoff et al., 1978; McDaniels et al.,
1

See Ashenfelter (2006) for a recent discussion of the VSL and Viscusi (2003) for an overview of VSL
figures estimated in compensating wage studies.
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1992)—on the value of reducing these risks, but results are mixed, so it is unclear if, and
by how much, existing VSL estimates from other contexts should be adjusted to cater to
hazardous waste site risks.
For these reasons, we use a stated-preference approach to elicit the tradeoffs that
people make between income and risk reductions in the hazardous waste site context.
Specifically, we showed people pairs of hypothetical public programs described by five
attributes—the annual risk reduction afforded by the program, the size of the population
living in the area with the contaminated sites that would be addressed by the program,
how soon such risk reductions would be observed, the number of years over which the
risk reduction would be observed (and hence lives would be saved), and the cost to the
taxpayer. We then asked them to indicate (i) which they would prefer out of these two
programs, and (ii) which they would prefer, program A, program B, or neither.
Statistical modeling of the responses to (i) and (ii) allows us to estimate the
VSL—the first of our research questions. In addition, it allows us to answer two related
questions: In the context of contaminated site policies, is the VSL affected by the
individual characteristics of the respondent? Are the responses to the choice questions
and the implied WTP figures internally valid, in the sense that they depend in predictable
ways on variables suggested by economic theory and confirm opinions expressed by the
respondent elsewhere in the questionnaire?
Because the time it takes before lives are saved and the number of years over
which lives would be saved are varied to the respondents, the responses to the conjoint
choice questions can be used to estimate the rate at which people discount future risk
reductions. Were such a rate found to be low, we would conclude that people care for
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permanent risk reductions, and that their WTP for risk reductions is little affected by the
lag until the risk reductions are incurred. The opposite conclusions would be reached if
the discount rate was found to be relatively high.
Earlier research has estimated the rates at which people discount lives saved in the
future (Cropper et al., 1991, 1992) and the rates at which people trade off current income
for future reductions in their own risk of dying (Horowitz and Carson, 1990; Moore and
Viscusi, 1990; Hammitt and Liu, 2004; Alberini et al., 2006), but to our knowledge none
of these studies are specific to or easily adapted to contaminated site cleanup policies.
None of them asked how much more people are prepared to pay for permanent risk
reductions.2
In this study, we pay special attention to the internal validity of the responses, so
we inquire about people’s preferences for permanence through direct attitude questions.
We also compare the discount rate estimated from money v. risk tradeoffs with that at
which people discount lives.
Finally, we note that by including among the attributes of the hypothetical
programs the size of the population living in the areas with the targeted contaminated
sites, we explore the question whether people care more for small risk reductions spread
over a large population or for larger risk reductions that affected a smaller population.
Here, attention is restricted to the hazardous waste site context, but this question is also of
great interest when comparing, say, air pollution policies, where the risk reductions are
small and cover a very large population, with other environmental policies targeted at
very specific populations.

2

Viscusi and Huber (2006) estimate the rate at which people discount the future benefits of clean water
policies in the US.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe key
concepts, including the VSL, and our methodology, including the conjoint choice
questions and the model of the responses to these questions. Section 3 describes the
survey questionnaire and the administration of the survey. Section 4 presents the data and
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Key Concepts, Methods and Models
A. What is the The Value of a Statistical Life?
The VSL is the marginal value of a reduction in the risk of dying, and is therefore
defined as the rate at which people are prepared to trade off income for a risk reduction:
(1)

VSL =

∂WTP
,
∂R

where WTP signifies the willingness to pay for a change in the risk of dying, and R is the
risk of dying. The VSL can be equivalently described as the total WTP by a group of N
people experiencing a uniform reduction of 1/N in their risk of dying. To illustrate,
consider a group of 10,000 individuals, and assume that each of them is willing to pay
€30 to reduce his or her own risk of dying by 1 in 10,000. The VSL implied by this WTP
is €30/0.0001, or €300,000.
The concept of VSL is generally deemed as the appropriate construct for ex ante
policy analyses, when the identities of the people whose lives are saved by the policy are
not known yet. The mortality benefits of a policy that saves L lives are equal to (VSL×L).

B. Policy Relevance

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 16 [2006]

7
Because hazardous waste site programs purport to eliminate or reduce threats to
public health and to reduce mortality risks, the VSL is a relevant concept when one wants
to estimate the benefits of one such program and compare them with its costs. In the US,
the Superfund statute spells out cleanup criteria to be adopted at the most egregious
contaminated sites in the nation, which are placed on the so-called National Priorities List
and may qualify for publicly financed cleanup.3
Specifically, EPA managers are directed to select target risk reductions to protect
human health and meet any “legally applicable” or “relevant and appropriate” standards
(e.g., maximum contaminant limits in groundwater), regardless of cost (Revesz and
Stewart, 1995). When selecting among alternative remedies that attain the selected target
risk reduction, consideration must be given to cost-effectiveness, practicable technologies

and permanent remediation—as opposed to simple containment to prevent migration of
pollutant and to limit exposure. Permanent remedies are generally more expensive, but
Gupta et al. (1996) find that the EPA has indeed heeded this preference for permanent
cleanups in its remediation decisions.4

3

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly
dubbed “Superfund”) was passed in 1980 to address the problem of hazardous waste sites and the risks they
pose to human health and ecological systems. The Superfund program provides for both emergency, shortterm “removals” and remedial actions, which imply more or less permanent measures to reduce
contamination. The statute also created an extensive and far-reaching liability system. The courts have
interpreted the Superfund liability to be strict, retroactive, and joint-and-several. The liability system (and
hence cleanup financing), cleanup processes and targets have been debated since the onset of the program.
See, among others, Barnett (1994), Harper and Adams (1996), Hird (1994), Revesz and Stewart (1995),
Viscusi and Hamilton (1999), Hamilton and Viscusi (1999), and Probst and Konisky (2001).
4
Gupta et al. (1996) empirically examine the preferences for permanence implicit in EPA’s cleanup
decisions at 110 wood preserving and PCB-contaminated Superfund sites. They focus on the choice of
cleanup technology for contaminated soil, where the least permanent and expensive option is to simply cap
the soil, and more permanent and more expensive options typically including excavating the soil and
placing it in approved landfill or treating it. Gupta et al. find that the EPA does have a preference for more
permanent cleanup options, but not at any cost, in the sense that the agency is less likely to choose a more
permanent remedy as the cost of the remedy increases. Still, the agency values permanence, in that the
premium it attaches to on-site incineration of waste (over and above the cost of capping it) is $12 million
(1987 dollars) at relatively small sites, and up to $40 million at large sites.
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Recent state programs, however, seem to be reversing this preference for
permanence. State voluntary cleanup programs, for example, offer a variety of incentives
in exchange for site cleanup (Meyer, 2000; US General Accounting Office [GAO],
1997), including simplified or variable cleanup standards linked to land use, engineering
controls (e.g., caps, fences, or other physical means of preventing contact with pollution),
and/or institutional controls, such as permanent land use restrictions at the site or
monitoring of the contamination plume, in place of (more stringent) cleanups. The US
GAO (1997) surveyed 17 state VCP programs and found that over 50% of the cleanups
entailed non-permanent remedies and/or adopted industrial land use standards.
Several European countries face similar dilemmas. In Italy, for example,
legislation addressing hazardous waste sites was first passed in 1997. The statute contains
an explicit preference for permanent remediation and for on-site treatment of
contaminated media, but recent analyses conducted by the Italian Environmental
Protection Agency and environmental organizations (APAT, 2004; Legambiente, 2005)
point out that the majority of actions at NPL and non-NPL contaminated sites have, thus
far, been short-term and impermanent. For several reasons—because this outcome
potentially conflicts with the European Union’s sustainability goals, because the Italian
law places the burden of remediation at orphan sites on municipalities,5 because funding
for cleanup is limited,6 and because of a recent law that emphasizes the role of risk

5

Unlike its US counterpart, the Italian Superfund statute is not retroactive. The law provides for “orphan”
sites—sites where the party responsible for the contamination is insolvent or no longer in existence, placing
the burden on these sites on the municipalities.
6
The estimated cleanup costs for the sites on the Italian NPL are €3,149 million, but the available public
funding tops off at €541 million.
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assessment7—it is important to study people’s preferences for more or less permanent
risk reductions and to elicit the VSL in this context.

C. Our Conjoint Choice Questions
Conjoint choice questions (also termed “experiments”) are a survey-based
technique frequently used to place a value on a good or estimate the benefits of a public
program. The approach is based on stated preferences, in the sense that it asks individuals
what they would do under hypothetical circumstances, rather than observing actual
behaviors on marketplaces.
In a conjoint choice survey, a good or public program is described in a stylized
fashion by a vector of attributes. Respondents are shown K alternative variants of this
good or program obtained by taking combinations of the possible values of the attributes,
and are asked to choose the most preferred (Hanley et al., 2001). The alternatives differ
from one another in the levels taken by two or more of the attributes. An advantage of
this method is that it is flexible and that it can span goods/programs, levels of risk
reductions and other aspects of environmental quality that do not currently exist.
Respondent choices are assumed to be motivated by a random utility model and to
trade off the attributes of the alternatives. If one of the attributes of the alternatives is its
cost, it is possible to calculate the marginal price of each attribute. If a “do nothing” or
status quo option is included in the choice set, the choice experiments can be used to
estimate the full value of—i.e., the WTP for—each alternative.

7

The new law (Decree N. 152/06, which went into force on April 29, 2006) places a major emphasis on
risk assessment, which is to be done when the level of contamination in soil or water exceeds the maximum
limit set by the law.
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In our conjoint choice questions, respondents are asked to consider hypothetical
public programs that would clean up sites where the responsible parties are no longer in
existence or do not have the means to pay for remediation. Respondents are also told that
the government would be in charge of the remediation programs, and that the programs
would be guaranteed to be effective.
The specifics of the programs are described using five attributes, namely (i) the
risk reduction per year, (ii) the size of the population living in the areas with the
contaminated sites targeted by the program, (iii) the delay until the risk reduction begins,
(iv) the number of years over which the risk reduction would be observed, and (v) the
cost of the program to the respondent, which would be incurred as an immediate, and
one-time, tax. Clearly, attribute (iii) gets at the heart of the latency issue,8 and attribute
(iv) captures the degree of permanence of the risk reductions.9
The respondents are shown a total of four pairs of hypothetical programs
constructed in this fashion. They are first asked to indicate which of the two programs—
A or B—they prefer, and then indicate which they would choose out of program A,
program B, or neither. This results in a total of 8 conjoint choice questions where the size
of the choice set is 2 (when choosing between A and B) or 3 (when choosing between A,
B, and the status quo).

8

By latency, we refer to a future risk reduction. In this paper, the terms “lag” and “latency” are used
interchangeably.
9
DeShazo and Cameron (2005), Tsuge et al. (2005), and Itaoka et al. (2006) are other recent applications of
the conjoint choice approach to value mortality risk reductions. DeShazo and Cameron ask respondents to
choose between profiles defined by expected lifetime, risk, illness and recovery, and cost to the respondent.
Tsuge et al. ask people to choose between two stylized government programs described by cost, size of the
risk reduction, type of risk (accident, cancer, heart disease, or a generic type of risk), and latency, finding
that the VSL is not sensitive to the type of risk, but does vary with latency and individual characteristics of
the respondent. Itaoka et al. compare low probability/large loss events with higher probability/small loss
events in the context of electric power generation in Japan.
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An example of the conjoint choice questions is reported in Appendix A, and a
summary of attributes and levels is reported in table 1. In earlier focus groups and oneon-one tests, people had generally deemed these attributes and attribute levels reasonable
and acceptable. We emphasize that the risk reductions were presented to the respondents
as the number of lives saved per million people (from the mortality rate due to
contaminated site exposures in the absence of cleanup).

Table 1. Attributes and attribute levels in the conjoint choice questions.
Attribute
Levels of the attribute
Lives saved per million people ( ∆R )
10, 20, 30
Population living in the areas with the
0.5 million, 1 million, 2 million
contaminated sites covered by the program (N)
Delay (number of years until the risk reduction 2, 10
is incurred) (A)
Duration of the health benefits (number of
20, 30, 45
years) (T)
One-time tax payment for the respondent’s
50, 100, 300, 500, 950
household (C) (in euro)

That risk reductions will be realized no earlier than two years from now (attribute
(ii) or “Delay” in table 1) is consistent with the notion that the pollutants at most
contaminated sites are carcinogens or cause long-term health effects, and with the fact
that it takes some time to complete even the most efficient government remediation
program. It is also reasonable to assume that no remediation program can reduce risks
forever: hence, we set the duration of the risk reductions at 20, 30 or 45 years. These may
be interpreted as time to failure of the remedies. The delay and duration attributes provide
variation in the timing of the mortality risk reductions across and within respondents,
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which we exploit for the purpose of estimating the rate at which people discount future
risks.
We chose a one-time tax to be incurred immediately for two reasons. First, since
risk reductions are incurred in the future, this allows us to estimate the rate at which
people discount risks. Second, in focus groups and during the survey development work
people voiced strong opinions against taxes and against committing to pay annual taxes
over a long period of time. We certainly did not want people to dismiss our scenarios
outright, and a one-time tax was the most appealing option.
We also vary the size of the population living in the areas with the contaminated
sites that would be addressed by the program, and hence potentially affected by the risk
reductions. We chose hypothetical populations of 0.5, 1 and 2 million because these
levels were judged credible by focus groups participants, especially when compared with
the total population living in areas with NPL sites (7 million; see section 3), and because
we felt that respondents could easily form a sense of the size of these populations by
comparing them with those of the cities they live in.
We created a total of 32 sets with four pairs of programs each. We began this task
by creating all of the possible alternative programs (i.e., all possible combinations of the
levels of the attributes). We then formed all of the possible pairs, but excluded pairs that
contained dominated alternatives.10 The 32 sets we used for the survey were obtained by
selecting four pairs at random (without replacement) out of this universe of nondominated pairs. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the 32 sets.

10

A pair has a dominated alternative if one of them is obviously better (e.g., saves more lives over a longer
period of time) and no more expensive than the other.
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D. The Model
We assume that in the conjoint choice questions our respondents choose the
alternative with the highest indirect utility, and that the indirect utility depends on the
discounted stream of risk reductions and on residual income. Formally,
(2)

Vij = α ⋅ DR + β ( yi − Cij ) ,

where Vij denotes the deterministic component of the indirect utility function, DR is the
discounted flow of risk reductions delivered by program j, y is income and C is the cost
of the program to the respondent. Coefficients α and β denote the marginal utility of the
discounted flow of risk reductions and the marginal utility of income, respectively. We
assume constant exponential discounting and define DR as
T

(3)

DR = exp(−δA) ⋅ ∫ ∆R ⋅ exp(−δt )dt =∆R ⋅ e
0

−δA

⎡1 − e −δT ⎤
⎢
⎥,
⎣ δ ⎦

where ∆R is the annual risk reduction (which is varied to the respondents but constant
over the years), δ is the discount rate, A is the number of years one must wait before the
risk reductions are observed, and T is the number of years over which lives are saved.
Expression (3) shows the effect of a delay in the beginning of the risk reduction (captured
by the term e −δA ) and the effect of more or less permanent risk reductions (captured by
term in brackets).
On appending an error term ε ij , equation (2) becomes a random utility model,
which in turn results in a conditional logit model if we further assume that the error terms

ε ij are independent across alternatives within the same respondent and follow the
standard type I extreme value distribution. The probability that option k is selected out of
K alternatives when answering a choice question is thus
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(4)

Pr( k ) =

exp(Vik )

,

K

∑ exp(V

ij

)

j =1

and the log likelihood function of our sample is
n

(5)

M

Km

log L = ∑∑∑ y mik ⋅ log Pr(i chooses k in choice question m )
i =1 m =1 k =1

n

M

Km

= ∑∑∑ y mik ⋅ log
i =1 m =1 k =1

exp(Vikm )
Km

∑ exp(V
j =1

ijm

,
)

where yimk is a binary indicator that takes on a value of 1 if the respondent i selects
alternative k in choice question m, and 0 otherwise, Km denotes the number of the
alternatives the respondent is faced with in choice question m, and M denotes the total
number of choice questions asked of the respondent.11 Equation (5) thus describes a nonlinear conditional logit. It assumes that the choice responses are independent within and
across respondents.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients can be used to compute the
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for any given program:
(6)

WTP =

αˆ
DR .
βˆ

The VSL, i.e., the willingness to pay for a marginal risk reduction to be incurred in the
current year, is equal to (αˆ / βˆ ) .

11

We remind the reader that individuals faced a total of four pairs of programs. For each pair of programs,
the respondent was asked two choice questions: (i) which of the two programs—A or B—is judged more
attractive, and (ii) which is the most preferred option—program A, program B, or neither (the status quo)?
This results in a total of eight conjoint choice questions, hence M=8, Km=2 for m=1, 3, 5, and 7, and Km=3
for m=2, 4, 6, and 8.
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E. Hypotheses

Clearly, model (2)-(3) assumes that the VSL is constant with respect to the size of
the risk reduction and the size of the population that would benefit from the cleanup. In
this paper, we wish to test if the VSL does indeed vary with the number of beneficiaries
of the program. To do so, we amend equation (2) to obtain:
(7)

Vij = α1 ⋅ DR0.5 + α 2 ⋅ DR1 + α 3 ⋅ DR2 + β ( yi − Cij ) ,

where DR0.5 =DR if the size of the population affected by the program is 0.5 million and
0 otherwise, DR1 =DR if the size of the population affected by the program is 1 million
and 0 otherwise, and DR2 =DR if the size of the population affected by the program is 2
million and 0 otherwise. We then test the null hypothesis that α1 = α 2 = α 3 . Failure to
reject the null implies that equation (7) is simplified to equation (2), i.e., the marginal
utility of a risk reduction is not affected by the size of the population of beneficiaries of
the program, N.
Another interesting null hypothesis is that α 2 = 2α1 and α 3 = 2α 2 . This null
hypothesis implies that what enters in the utility function is the discounted number of
lives saved, rather than discounted risk. The indirect utility function would thus be

(8)

Vij = γ ⋅ L + β ( yi − Cij ) ,

where L is discounted lives saved:
T

(9)

L = exp( −δA) ⋅ ∫ ∆R ⋅ N ⋅ exp( −δt )dt =∆R ⋅ N ⋅ e −δA

1 − e −δT

0

δ

.

Equations (8) and (9) mean that the VSL is strictly proportional to N, the size of the
population living in the areas targeted by the hypothetical program.
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We are also interested in testing whether the marginal utility of risk reductions
and the marginal utility of income depend on individual characteristics. To see if this is
the case, we amend equation (1) (or (6)) to allow for heterogeneity among the
respondents.12 Specifically, we posit that the marginal utility of risk reduction for
respondent i is α i = α1 + x i α 2 and that the marginal utility of income is β i = β1 + β 2 Pi ,
where xi is a vector of individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, own
health, familiarity with contaminated sites and remediation, acceptance of government
policies addressing hazardous waste sites, etc., and P is a low-income dummy. In other
words, we form interaction terms between the arguments of equation (2)—DR and
residual income—and xi and P, respectively, and add these interactions in the right-hand
side of the indirect utility function:
Vij = α1 ⋅ DRij + ( DRij × x i )α 2 + β1 ⋅ ( yi − Cij ) + β 2 [( yi − Cij ) Pi ] .

(10)

Finally, it is possible to replace δ with a function of individual characteristics zi of
the respondent, such as age, whether he or she is married and has young children, etc.:

δ i = z iπ .

3. Structure of the Questionnaire and Survey Administration

Our conjoint choice questions are at the heart of our questionnaire and are
accordingly placed roughly in the middle of the survey instrument. They are preceded by
many other questions that first find out what people already know about specific
problems or concepts (e.g., contaminated sites, health risks from exposure to
12

As shown below, although we find that the marginal utility of risk reduction is different for different
population sizes, in practice the VSL is constant with respect to population size. For this reason, we
incorporate covariates only in the simpler specification of the indirect utility function, allowing α and β to
vary across respondents but not across the size of population in the conjoint choice questions.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

17

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 16 [2006]

17
contaminants, remediation) or feel about policy options, and then educate them about
risks, remediation techniques, etc.
The questionnaire is comprised of 5 sections. Section 1 begins with asking people
whether and how they are acquainted with contaminated sites. Since a respondent’s
notion of contaminated site may be different from our own, we then provide the
following definition: “A contaminated site is a parcel or an area with hazardous
substances that pose risks to human health or the environment, now or in the future.
These hazardous substances are the result of human activities. Electromagnetic
fields/pollution and air pollution are not considered contaminated sites in this
questionnaire.” In section 2, we briefly describe the problem of contaminated sites in
Italy and provide succint information about the total population living in areas with sites
on the National Priorities List—the most egregious contaminated sites—and thus
potentially exposed to contaminants, current legislation and government policies.
In section 3 we inquire about the health risks people perceive to be associated
with contaminated sites, and then explain, using animation, how people are typically
exposed to contaminants. A list of the possible short- and long-term health effects of
exposure to certain substances follows. For example, respondents are told that heavy
metals have been linked with kidney damage, adverse effects on the neurological and
immune systems, and may cause cancer.
At this point, we focus on mortality endpoints and provide an estimate of the
baseline mortality risks associated with exposure to pollutants found at contaminated
sites. Specifically, respondents are told that exposures to pollutants at contaminated sites
results in 243 deaths per million people a year and that a total of about 7 million people
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live in the areas with National Priorities List sites, resulting in an estimated 1700 deaths
per year linked to contaminated site exposures.13
When asking people to value risk reductions for a specific cause, it is important
that respondents be told how this risk compares with mortality rates for other causes. This
is exactly what we do in the next screen, which displays a bar chart with the most
important causes of death in Italy (i.e., cardiovascular causes, which account for 4480
deaths per million people every year; cancer, which accounts for 2290 deaths per million
people every year), and, for comparison, less frequent but familiar causes of death, such
as road-traffic accident (125 in a million per year) or carbon monoxide poisoning (35 in
million a year) (see Figure 1). Respondents are subsequently tested for risk
comprehension.

13

We were not able to find estimates of the risks and population at risk for the sites on the Italian National
Priorities List. We calculated an estimate of the baseline risks before cleanup by transferring estimates of
risks in other contaminated areas in Italy. Specifically, we relied on a World Health Organization study
which identifies highly industrialized and polluted areas in Italy, computes mortality rates for men and
women in these areas in 1990-94, and compares them with those of the surrounding regions. This study
concludes that in those years the highly industrialized areas experienced about 800 excess deaths per year
(Martuzzi et al., 2002; Mitis et al., 2005). When this figure is divided by the exposed population (3,295,380
people), we obtain an excess risk of about 243 per million, which we posit to be our baseline risk.
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Figure 1. Baseline risks.

Number of deaths in 1,000,000 Italian people in a year
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Since our conjoint choice questions are concerned with public programs, we next
inquire about how important it is for the respondent to reduce the health risks posed by
contaminated sites, and how much confidence they place in public policies such as
economic incentives for firms, dissemination of information, more stringent inspections,
institutional controls, and remediation undertaken directly by the government at orphan
sites.
In section 4 we present the concept of remediation and provide examples of
possible remediation technologies, pointing out that they vary in terms of cost and
completion time, and that different sites and pollutants require different remedies. For
example, pump-and-treat options are appropriate for contaminated groundwater, while
bioremediation may be used at petroleum sites.
This is followed by the conjoint choice experiment portion of the questionnaire.
A reminder of the baseline risks is shown at the top of each screen with the pairs of
programs and the associated choice questions.
We use additional questions to gather further evidence about preferences for
saving lives and about the rate of time preference. For example, we ask our respondents
which option they would prefer, a program that saves 100 lives now, or one that saves
(100+X) in Y years, where the respondents are told to assume equal costs, and both X
and Y are varied to the respondents. The discount rate for lives saved implicit in the
responses to these questions can be compared to the one implicit in the money v. future
risk reductions tradeoffs in the conjoint choice questions.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 16 [2006]

21
We also ask people to express their agreement or disagrement with statements
spelling out possible priorities for cleanup and risk reductions. Section 5 concludes the
questionnaire with the usual sociodemographic questions and with questions about the
respondent’s own health.
The survey was self-administered using the computer by respondents recruited
from the general population in four cities in Italy (Venice, Milan, Bari and Naples14) in
May 2005, for a total of 804 completed questionnaires. The sample was stratified by age,
with an equal number of respondents in each of three broad age groups (25-44, 45-54, 5565), and was comprised of a roughly equal number of men and women. We did not
expect all respondents to be familiar with computers, so we made sure that two
interviewers were present at the survey facilities at all times to welcome the respondents,
introduce the survey to them and provide assistance if requested.

4. Results

A. The Sample

Descriptive statistics of the respondents are displayed in table 2. Our sample is
well-balanced in terms of gender, and its distribution by age is consistent with the
sampling plan. The average age is 47. The average annual household income is
approximately €27,000, which is close to, but slightly lower than, the national average
(€29,483, Banca d’Italia, 2006).
14

These cities were selected to ensure geographic representativeness and because each has one or more
sites on the National Priorities List. The chemical and oil refining complex of Porto Marghera in the Venice
hinterland is probably the most egregious contaminated site on the NPL, with soils, groundwater and
Lagoon sediments contaminated by polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), heavy metals and many
other pollutants. The former Fibronit complex, an asbestos-processing facility, is located in downtown Bari,
while the NPL site in Naples is a closed steel mill. Milan, as the center of a large industrial area, has several
NPL sites.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper16

22

Alberini et al.: Paying for Permanence: Public Preferences for Contaminated S

22
Almost 50% of our sample has a high school diploma and 13.43% has a college
degree or higher education. Comparison with population statistics reveals that our sample
has a larger share of persons with high school diploma than the population, but is similar
to the population in terms of share of persons with college degree or post-graduate
education. (The population statistics are 32% and 11%, respectively.) Table 1B in
Appendix B displays other descriptive statistics for education in the sample and in the
populations of the four cities.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the respondents (N=804)
Variable
Male
Age
Married
age2534
age3544
age4554
age55plus
Collegedegree

Household size
Children5

Household
income
(€/year)

Description
Dummy equal to 1 if the
respondent is a male
Respondent age
Dummy equal to 1 if
married
Respondent is aged 25-34
Respondent is aged 35-34
Respondent is aged 45-54
Respondent is aged 55 or
older
Dummy equal to 1 if
respondent has a college
degree or post-graduate
education
Number of household
members
Dummy equal to 1 if
respondent has children of
ages ≤15
Take-home household
income

Mean
0.51

Stand. Devn.
0.50

Min
0

Max
1

47.02
0.73

11.25
0.44

25
0

65
1

0.19
0.18
0.29

0.39
0.38
0.46

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.34

0.47

0

1

0.13
3.26

0.34
1.17

0
1

1
8

0.28
26,955

0.45
16,872

0
5,000

1
100,000

Regarding their familiarity with contaminated sites, as shown in table 3, 90% of
the respondents stated that they had heard about contaminated sites before. Most of these
persons reported that they learned about contaminated sites by watching television.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

23

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 16 [2006]

23
Forty-three percent of the sample indicated that they are aware of contaminated sites near
their homes or workplaces. Fully 80% of the respondents were acquainted with the
concept of cleanup, and 37% stated that they were personally aware of previously
contaminated sites that had been subsequently cleaned up.

Variable

Table 3: Knowledge of contaminated sites. N=804.
Description
Percent of
the sample

HEARD

Respondent has heard about contaminated sites
before

90.04

KNOWSITE

Respondent is aware of a contaminated site near
home or the workplace

43.16

HEARBONI

Respondent has heard
contaminated sites before

of

79.98

KNOWBONI Respondent is aware of a contaminated site that
has been cleaned up

36.70

about

cleanup

In table 4 we report the respondents’ views of possible priorities for contaminated
site policies, answers to debriefing questions, and concern about mortality risks, which
we use to examine the internal validity of the responses to the conjoint choice questions.
As show in table 4, almost 89% of the respondent stated that it is “very important” to
them personally to reduce the human health risks posed by contaminated sites. Only 7%
of the respondents indicated that they only thought of future generations when answering
the conjoint choice questions. Indeed, the majority (76%) of the respondents thought
about their own exposure, that of their family members, of other people and of future
generations, with only 2.86% focusing exclusively on themselves and 2.99% focusing
exclusively on other people’s exposure.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper16

24

Alberini et al.: Paying for Permanence: Public Preferences for Contaminated S

24
Fully 40% of the sample strongly agreed that cleanups should take place, even if
their benefits are experienced only 30 years from now, and 80% expressed strong
agreement with the statement that cleanups should be as permanent as possible, even if
they cost more.15 At the same time, 69% of the sample deemed policies based on fencing
off and prohibiting access to contaminated sites “very helpful.” Taken together with table
3, these statistics suggest that most people have at least some rudimentary information
about contaminated sites and cleanup programs, that the latter should be meaningful to
them, and that they should accept our hypothetical scenarios, which depict public
remediation programs.16
Finally, about 30% of the sample reported that a family member has had or has
cancer, and 45% claimed that they do use seatbelt when riding in the backseat of a car.
We interpret familiarity with cancer as a proxy for concern over this illness, and use of
seatbelt as concern for, and willingness to undertake action against, mortality risks (albeit
of a different nature than cancers and other illnesses associated with exposures to
contaminants).

15

To further elaborate on this matter, when asked to express agreement or disagrement with the statement
that “Priority should be given to permanent and effective cleanups even if they are more expensive,”
79.60% of the respondents “strongly” agreed, 12.31% was in agreement with the statement, 5.85% was
neutral, and only 1.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed (see Turvani et al., 2006).
16
These conclusions are further corroborated by the responses to other Likert-scale questions, which
suggest that respondents expect the government to take an active role in the management of contaminated
site situations. Specifically, two-thirds of the sample state that it would be “very useful” to offer tax credits
and other economic incentives to firms to encourage cleanups, and over 80% ascribe the same degree of
usefulness to direct government cleanup of orphan sites. Almost 90% find stringent inspections and
regulatory approaches to pollution control “very useful” (see Turvani et al., 2006).
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Variable

Table 4. Opinions on contaminated sites policies and
concern about mortality risks. N=804.
Description
Percent of
the sample

Impexpos

Respondent deems it very important to reduce the adverse
effects on human health of hazardous wastes
Solofut
Respondent thought only of future generations when
answered conjoint choice questions
Futben
Favorable to cleanup even if its benefits are experienced 30
or more years from now
Durat
Respondent strongly agrees that remediation should be as
permanent as possible even it costs more
Cartelli
Respondents deems policies based on fencing off
contaminated sites and preventing access very helpful
Famcancer Respondent’s family members have had cancer

29.98

Seatbelt

45.02

Respondent uses seatbelts when travelling in the back seat of
a car

88.93
7.21
40.55
79.60
68.53

B. Responses to the Choice Questions

Following Viscusi et al. (1991), we checked how many people always pick plan A
in all of the eight choice questions (87 people, or 10.82% of the sample), plan B in all
eight choice questions (60 people, for 7.46% of the sample), and exhibited preference
“reversals”17 in one or more choice questions (65 people, or 8.31% of the sample).
Always choosing the plan on the left or the plan on the right (or exhibiting a “reversal”)
does not necessarily imply that people are violating the basic tenets of the random utility
model, but at any rate these behaviors account for very small fractions of the sample.
In table 5 we examine the choice frequencies observed when people were given
the option to choose between program A, program B, and the status quo. The frequency
of “neither program” responses is less than 20%, suggesting that people were not

17

A preference reversal would be observed if, for example, when asked to choose between A and B, the
respondent states that B is the more preferred program, and then, when asked which he prefers among A, B,
and the status quo, he chooses A.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper16

26

Alberini et al.: Paying for Permanence: Public Preferences for Contaminated S

26
dismissing the public programs being shown to them without giving them due
consideration. The remainder are rather even split between program A and B, suggesting
that there were no obvious choices between the hypothetical programs.

Table 5. Frequencies of observed responses to the question “Which would you prefer
between A, B, and neither program?”
Pairs of program Percent
Percent
Percent
choose A choose B choose
“neither”
42.41
37.69
19.9
1
2

43.66

37.81

18.53

3

42.16

40.67

17.16

4

42.79

39.05

18.16

C. VSL Estimates

The results of the non-linear conditional logit models of the responses to the
conjoint choice questions are reported in table 6. The indirect utility function underlying
the two logits is equation (7), and the two regressions differ solely for the criteria we used
to clean the sample. Model I uses the full sample, which consists of 782 usable
observations.18 For good measure, in model II we further discard those subjects who
failed all of the four probability comprehension quizzes (N=58) and/or exhibited
preference reversals (N=65). The estimation results are very similar to those of model I.
Briefly, table 6 shows clearly that risk reductions are positively and significantly
valued by the respondents. Within a model, the estimated αj coefficients (where j denote

18

A total of 804 respondents completed the questionnaire, but we discarded the choice responses of the 22
individuals who were shown a conjoint choice question screen with a typographical error in the risk
reduction.
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the population size, ranging from half a million to 2 million) are within 10 to 20% of one
another. The marginal utility of income is positive and significant, and the discount rate is
pegged at 6.9%.
Wald test statistics of 66.69 (for the full sample; p-value < 0.0001) and 51.09 (for
the “cleaned” sample; p-value < 0.0001) reject soundly the null hypothesis that α 2 = 2α 1
and α 3 = 2α 2 , providing evidence against indirect utility (9).19 Wald test statistics of
10.02 and 12.45 for the full and “cleaned” samples, respectively, also reject the null that
the marginal utility of discounted risk reductions is the same regardless of the size of the
population.20

Table 6. Conjoint choice questions: conditional logit models.

ALPHA1
ALPHA2
ALPHA3
BETA
DELTA
log L
N obs
N respondents

Model I
all data
coefficient t stat.
0.0049
8.19
0.0053
8.187
0.0044
7.85
0.0009
11.595
0.0689
9.542

Model II
Cleaned data (no
preference reversals,
no allwrong=1)
Coefficient
t stat.
0.0045
7.104
0.0051
7.228
0.0041
6.838
0.0009
11.29
0.0685
8.284

-5370.13
6256
782

-4558.36
5296
662

19

We also estimated a conditional logit equation (shown in Appendix C) that assumes that the deterministic
component of the indirect utility is a linear combination of the attributes of the alternatives. This model
must be estimated separately for the subsample with Delay=2 and the subsample with Delay=10. The logit
coefficients indicate that the likelihood of selecting a program increases with the size of the risk reduction
and decreases with its cost, and does not depend on the size of the population living in the areas with the
contaminated sites to be targeted by the hypothetical programs for Delay=2, whereas it is negatively related
to it for Delay=10. The effect of duration is consistent with our expectations for Delay=2 but is
insignificant for Delay=10.
20
The respective P-values are 0.001 and 0.00047, respectively.
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The VSL for a risk reduction to be incurred in the current year implied by the
coefficients of model I in table 6 is €5.547 million (standard error around the VSL €0.806
million) when the affected population is 0.5 million, €5.996 million (s.e. €0.929 million)
when the population is 1 million, and €5.056 million (s.e. €0.840 million) when the
affected population is 2 million.21, 22
Even more importantly, these three VSL figures are not statistically different from
one another, so in what follows we estimate (non-linear) conditional logit models that
restrict the marginal utility of the risk reductions—the αs—to be the same for all
population sizes used in the questionnaire. We argue that doing so should bring only
negligible biases upon the estimated VSL. The results of such a restricted model are
reported in table 7 for the full sample. All coefficients are close to their counterparts in
table 6, and the implied VSL for a risk reduction to be incurred in the current year is
€5.58 million (s.e. €0.771 million). This figure is in the ballpark of the values of a
statistical case of cancer derived by Gayer et al. (2000, 2002) under alternate assumptions
about how individuals form and update their priors about risks.23
It is also very close to the VSL figure ($6.1 million, 1999 dollars) used by the US
EPA in its policy analyses (US EPA, 2000) and higher than that used by the European
Commission (whether or not a 40% cancer premium is added).24 Our 5.6 million lies on

21

We remind the reader that the VSL is what people are willing to pay in the current year for a marginal
change in risk to be incurred entirely in the current year, and that here it is estimated as α divided by β,
multiplied by one million. (The multiplication by one million is necessary because in our dataset for
estimation purposes the risk reduction was coded as 10, 20, or 30, instead of 10, 20, or 30×10-6.)
22
The standard errors were computed using the delta method (described in Appendix D).
23
Gayer et al. (2000) find that a reduction of individual cancer risk by 1.81E-06 after the Remedial
Investigation results in a implied value of statistical case of cancer between $3.9 and 4.6 million. If we
assume that the conditional mortality for cancer is 70% (see below) and adjust to 2005 dollars (see
http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateCPI.html), the resulting VSL is $6.7-7.9 million.
24
See http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/others/recommended_interim_values.pdf.
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the high end of the range of VSL found by Alberini and Chiabai (forthcoming) in a
previous CV study of Italians, where attention was restricted to the risk of dying for
cardiovascular and respiratory causes, the risk reduction was private and there was no
mention of environmental circumstances.

Table 7. Non-linear conditional logit model. Full sample (Nobs=6256, Number of
respondents=782).
ALPHA
BETA
DELTA
Log L

coefficient
t stat.
0.0050
8.38
0.0009
12.36
0.0741
9.82
-5369.20

D. Implications for Latency and Permanence

As shown in table 7, the discount rate in the simplified model is 7.41%. This
figure is significantly different from zero, suggesting that our respondents do indeed
discount risk reductions that occur in the future. This estimate of the discount rate is
reasonable, but not too low, confirming that a unit of risk reduction is valued less if it
occurs in the future, and suggesting that people care about permanence, but not at any
cost. Our respondents discount future risk reductions at a rate that is well within the range
estimated in earlier studies (typically 1-14%; see Alberini et al., 2006).
The implications of a discount rate of this magnitude can be illustrated in several
ways. For example, for a risk reduction of 1 in a million in the current year, the VSL is
€5.6 million, but if this risk reduction were to be incurred in 10 years, the applicable VSL
would be €2.66 million (s.e. around the VSL €0.296 million), and if it were to be incurred
20 years from now—the lag used in analyses of arsenic maximum contaminant limits in
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drinking water25—the applicable VSL would fall to only €1.26 million (s.e. €0.158
million). (This is because a one-time risk reduction of 1 in a million a year occurring 10
years from now is equivalent to an immediate, one-time risk reduction of 0.4766 in a
million. The same 1-in-a-million risk reduction occurring 20 years from now is
equivalent to an immediate, one-time risk reduction of 0.2272 in a million.)
As a second example, consider a program that delivers an annual risk reduction of
10 in a million, and begins in two years. If the risk reduction were to continue for 10
years, the typical respondent’s one-time WTP would be €340. This would increase to
€502 if the duration of the program doubled, €579 if it lasted 30 years, €616 if it lasted 40
years, and €626 if it lasted 45 years. Clearly, the WTP is less than proportional to the
duration of the program (and to total nominal—undiscounted—risk reduction), as shown
in Figure 2.

25

A 20-year lag between now and the time of the risk reduction is, for example, that considered by the EPA
Science Advisory Board when examining the maximum contaminant limit allowable for arsenic in drinking
water. See www.house.gov/science/ets/oct04/ets_charter_100401.htm (accessed 22 January, 2006).
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Figure 2. WTP for a program with ∆R =10 per million per year starting two years
from now.
WTP for 10 in a million a year (starting in 2 years)
700

WTP now

600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
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20
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50

Duration of the program

Consider now two programs that save the same number of (undiscounted) lives
and affect the same population (1 million people), except that in one the risk reduction is
10 in a million a year and the duration of the program is 20 years, while in the other the
risk reduction is 20 in a million a year and the duration of the program is 10 years. Both
programs would realize the risk reductions starting two years from now. The one-time
WTPs for these programs are €502 and €680, respectively, confirming that our
respondents value more highly programs that saves lives sooner, even if those programs
are shorter-lived. Finally, consider the former of these two programs, but imagine that it
began saving lives 10 years from now: WTP would fall from €502 to €277.

E. The Effect of Individual Characteristics
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The results from the model with individual-specific marginal utilities of risk
reduction, income and discount rates are displayed in table 8. We remind the reader that
these results refer to equation (10), which posits that the VSL is “individuated” (Sunstein,
2004), but constant with respect to the size of the population living in the areas with the
sites that would be affected by the hypothetical policy.
Table 8 (top right portion) displays the estimates of the marginal utilities of
income. In this specification of the model, our low-income dummy takes on a value of 1
if the respondent’s income is below the sample average, and zero otherwise. Clearly,
people with income below the sample average have a higher marginal utility of income
than the remainder of the sample, which is consistent with prescriptions from economic
theory.26
Turning to the marginal utility of risk reductions, Table 8 shows that males value
risk reductions more highly, all else the same, but that having a college degree does not
imply a statistically different marginal utility of risk reductions. Likewise, the α
coefficients on age group dummies are insignificant.
Surprisingly, persons who told us they knew about contaminated sites in their
neighborhood or near their workplace (KNOW), and persons who care about the health
effects of exposure to contaminants (IMPX) appear to value risk reductions less than the
other respondents. Perhaps the former effect is due to the fact that familiarity with
contaminated sites reduces the perceived severity of risk. Alternatively, it is possible that
people may have self-selected into areas with contaminated sites, so that the negative sign
captures the fact that people living close to such sites are less bothered by their presence.
26

We experimented with different ways of constructing the low income dummies (for example, a lowincome person is one with annual household income less than €15,000, which corresponds to about a
quarter of the sample), and found that the results are qualitatively robust to these changes.
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We do not have a good explanation for why people who worry about the health risks of
contaminants should value less highly risk reductions.27 At any rate, both effects are
sizeable: They lower the VSL by €0.850 million and €1.860 million for a respondent with
relatively low income.
We conjectured that acceptance of government contaminated site remediation
programs should affect the marginal utility of risk reductions, and ultimately the WTP for
the program, and indeed these expectations are borne out in the data. Respondents who
believe that the government should take care of orphan sites (ORFAN) value the risk
reductions and the program more highly than the other respondents, whereas people who
deem it “very useful” to fence and prohibit access to contaminated sites (CART) are
willing to pay less, all else the same. Perhaps doing so is judged sufficient to reduce risks,
so that no additional long-term remediation is deemed necessary. For a lower-income
person, holding such an opinion lowers the VSL by €0.950 million.
Finally, respondents whose family members have had cancer (FAMCAN) and
respondents who profess to use seatbelts (SEATB) when they travel in the back seat of a
car—which we interpret as indicating concern about mortality risks—value risk
reductions more highly. The corresponding increases in WTP for a less wealthy person
are €2.76 million and €2.09 million, respectively.
Regarding the determinants of the personal discount rates, we find that, all else
the same, discount rates are 1 percentage point lower for persons with young children, 1
percentage point higher for married persons, and almost 3 percentage points lower among
people of ages 45-54. They are also 1.8 percentage point higher for males, but this effect
27

We conjectured that such a negative coefficient might reflect the negative correlation between IMPX and
the educational attainment of the respondent, but found that the correlation coefficient between IMPX and
COLLEGEDEGREE is very low (-0.07). We conclude that this is an unlikely explanation.
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is statistically significant only at the 10% significance level, whereas the abovelisted
associations are all significant at the 5% level or better.

Table 8. Non-linear conditional logit with individual-specific marginal utility of risk
reduction, income and discount rate.
marginal utility of ∆R
variable
coefficient t stat.
ALPHA1
0.003704
3.168
A_KNOW
-0.00092
-2.271
A_IMPX
-0.00199
-2.559
A_COLLEG
-0.00038
-0.764
A_BONI
0.000433
1.206
A_AGE55P
-0.00137
-1.194
A_AGE45
-0.00111
-0.976
A_AGE35
-0.00178
-1.469
A_MALE
0.002868
3.314
A_CART
-0.00102
-2.485
A_ORFAN
0.001959
3.704
A_FAMCAN 0.002955
2.800
A_SEATB
0.002242
5.221

marginal utility of income
variable
coefficient t stat.
BETA
0.00063
6.122
BETAPOOR
0.00044
3.865
discount rate
variable
coefficient
DELTA
0.091449
D_KIDS
-0.00988
D_MARRIE
0.010502
D_DURAT
-0.0351
D_FUTBEN
0.005837
D_SOLFUT
-0.0066
D_MALE
0.017756
D_AGE55P
-0.01859
D_AGE455
-0.02879
D_AGE354
-0.02214
D_FCANC
0.025818

t stat.
5.326
-1.988
1.972
-4.130
1.253
-0.834
1.672
-1.282
-2.003
-1.399
2.164

That people are internally consistent is confirmed by the fact the discount rate is
3.5 percentage points lower for those persons who strongly agree with the statement that
remediation should be as permanent as possible, even if it costs more (dummy DURAT).
By contrast, the coefficient on a dummy capturing whether the respondent favors
remediation even if its benefits are experienced 30 or more years from now—FUTBEN—
and that on a dummy—SOLFUT—capturing sole concern for future generations as a
driver of the responses to the conjoint choice questions are not statistically significant.
Finally, people whose family members have had cancer tend to have significantly higher
discount rates (by about 2.6 percentage points).
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F. Additional Tests of Internal Validity

In our questionnaire, we also ask the following question: “Suppose there were two
public programs for cleaning up contaminated sites. These two programs differ for
technology and completion time. Program A saves 100 lives now. Program B saves X
lives in Y years. If the cost of the two program were the same, which would you choose,
A or B?” X and Y were varied to the respondents (X= 150, 200, 300, 400; Y = 10, 20, 30,
40, 45).28
Let D* be the discount rate that makes the two programs have equal discounted
lives saved.29 In our survey, D* ranged from less than 1 percent to about 14%. The
respondent should choose program A if his or her own discount rate, Di, is greater than
D*, B if Di is less than D*, and should be indifferent between the two programs if Di is
equal to D*.
We assume that Di is i.i.d. normal with mean µ D and variance σ D2 . Our sample is
thus a mix of binary and continuous observations, and the log likelihood function is
(11)

log L =

⎛ µD

∑ lnΦ⎜⎜ σ

i∈choose A

⎝

D

−

⎡
⎛µ
⎛µ
Di* ⎞
D * ⎞⎤
D* ⎞
⎟⎟ + ∑ ln ⎢1 − Φ ⎜⎜ D − i ⎟⎟⎥ + ∑ lnφ ⎜⎜ D − i ⎟⎟
σ D ⎠ i∈choose B ⎣
⎝ σ D σ D ⎠⎦ i∈indifferent ⎝ σ D σ D ⎠

where Φ (⋅) and φ (⋅) are the cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively.

28

For comparison, Cropper et al. (1991, 1992) ask a sample of Maryland residents, a sample of residents of
the Washington, DC, area, and a national sample the following question: “Without new programs, 100
people will die this year from pollution and 200 people will die 50 years from now. The government has to
choose between two programs that cost the same, but there is only enough money for one. Program A will
save 100 lives now. Program B will save 100 lives 50 years from now. Which program would you
choose?” The number of lives saved by program B and the number of years from now when lives are saved
were varied to the respondents.
29
In other words, assuming constant exponential discounting, D*=(-1/Y)*(ln(100/X)).
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The responses to the latter question indicate that most people (80%, or 626
individuals) prefer the program that saves lives now, 14.7% (115 people) prefer the one
that saves lives in the future, and 5.2% (41 people) are indifferent between the two.30 We
estimate µ D to be equal to 12.36%, while σ D is pegged at 0.0870 (see table 9, panel
(A)). The former figure suggests that the mean discount rate is larger than, but within the
ballpark of, the discount rate inferred from the conjoint choice tradeoffs. The latter
indicates that there is substantial heterogeneity among people’s individual discount rates.
Such heterogeneity is consistent with the fact that, when asked to rate their
agreement with the statement “We should avoid spending money on cleanup programs
that will save lives only 30 years from now” on a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1=strongly
disagree and 5=strongly agree), 40.55% of the sample chose response category 1, 10.07%
chose 2, 14.43% chose 3, 7.46% chose 4, and 23.76% chose 5.
Equation (11) can be amended to allow the expected value of Di to depend on
individual characteristics of the respondents (such as age, gender, knowledge of the
problem of contaminated sites, education, etc.). As shown in table 9, panel (B), we find
only modest evidence that Di depends systematically on individual characteristics of the
respondents. Whatever evidence there is, however, it is broadly consistent with that from
the earlier conjoint choice question exercise: The discount rate for lives is about 2
percentage points lower for those respondents who are at least somewhat favorable to
remediation even when its benefits are incurred many years into the future (dummy
FUTBEN), and 2 percentage points lower among the 45-54 year-olds.

30

Cropper et al. (1991) report that in their combined Maryland and Washington, DC area samples, fully
40% of the respondent chose the program that saves lives now, even when the number of lives to be saved
in the future was very large.
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Table 9. Continuous-Discrete model of discount rates for lives saved. N=782.

Variable
Intercept
kids15
married
durat
futben
solofuture
male
age55plus
age4554
age3544
famcancer

σD

(A)
Model without
covariates
Coefficient T Stat.
0.1236
14.21

0.0870

Log L

-285.83

10.23

(B)
Model with covariates
Coefficient T Stat.
0.1385
8.05
0.0029
0.25
0.0000
0.00
0.0026
0.23
-0.0222
-2.34
-0.0111
-0.66
-0.0052
-0.58
0.0011
0.07
-0.0241
-1.64
-0.0047
-0.30
0.0066
0.65
0.0854
-279.59

10.29

5. Discussion and Conclusions

We have deployed conjoint choice questions to investigate the tradeoffs people
are prepared to make between income and mortality risk reductions delivered by
contaminated site remediation programs. Our survey questionnaire was designed to
investigate the value that people place on permanent risk reductions, and to assess the
effect of lag (or latency), i.e., people pay now, but the risk reduction is incurred in the
future. The questionnaire was self-administered using the computer by a sample of
residents of four Italian cities with serious contaminated site problems.
We find that people are willing to pay for permanence, but not just any price. We
estimate the VSL for an immediate risk reduction over the current year to be about €5.6
million. The VSL does not vary significantly with the size of the population that would
be affected by the policy. However, the VSL is lower if the risk reduction occurs in the
future. For a risk reduction occuring exactly 20 years from now, for example, we estimate
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our respondents’ VSL to be only €1.27 million. People discount future risk reductions at
a rate of 7.41%, which means that each respondent is willing to pay €340 now for a risk
reduction of 10 in a million per year that begins in two years and continues over 10 years.
For a more permanent risk reduction, such as one that continues over 20 years, each
respondent would be willing to pay €502. For one that continues over 30 years, the WTP
would be €579, and for one that lasts 45 years, €626. Clearly, risk reductions that take
place in the more distant future are valued less highly than more immediate risk
reductions.
We find evidence that the VSL is individuated, in that it depends on observable
individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender and income), familiarity with contaminated
sites, concern about the health effects of exposure to contaminants, and direct experience
with cancer. The VSL also depends on what the respondent thinks the goals of a
remediation program should be, and on which government actions he or she deems
appropriate. (However, policymakers may not be able to use all of this information in
policy analyses, because attitudes, beliefs and confidence in specific government actions
are usually not known for the entire population of beneficiaries of the policy.)
Additional questions indicate that the rate at which people discount future risk
reductions in money versus risk tradeoffs is within the ballpark of the rate at which they
discount future lives. We interpret this as further evidence of good internal validity of the
data, and of the fact that people were paying attention to the attributes of the program we
wanted to focus on, including the futurity of risk reductions.
The results of this study could be used in benefit-cost analyses of Superfund-like
programs. Unfortunately, information about current risks associated with contaminated
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site exposures before and after cleanup of sites on the Italian National Priorities List are
not publicly available. Absent these data, we perform an illustrative benefit-cost analysis
for a 43-hectare operating unit within the broader NPL site at Marghera, near Venice,
Italy. In this operating unit—a former industrial waste dump owned by the City of
Venice—soil and groundwater are heavily contaminated with PAHs, heavy metals, and
many other toxicants.
Following Patassini et al. (2003, 2005), we focus on soil, for which remediation
options include soil washing, thermal desorption, capping, and excavation with
subsequent shipment of the contaminated soil to an approved hazardous waste disposal
facility. We restrict attention to capping—the least permanent of remedies—and to
excavation and removal of soil—the most permanent and the most expensive, and assume
reuse for residential purposes. Based on their estimate of excess lifetime cancer risks
(4.78E-03) and a conservative assumption of 70% conditional mortality,31 the annual
mortality risk for residents is 4.54E-05. Assuming that risk reductions would begin 10
years from now, and an exposed population of 30,000—as estimated in the Master Plan
of the City of Venice (Regione Veneto and Comune di Venezia, 2004)— a permanent
remedy like excavation and removal of the contaminated soil would require at least an
87% risk reduction for the mortality benefits to exceed the cost of remediation (€45,589
million).32 By contrast, the least permanent of remedies, capping, which is estimated to

31

This rate is for the 1980s, the most recent period for which estimates are available (see
http://www.istitutotumori.mi.it/menuistituto/diparclinici/epidemiologia, and Verdecchia et al., 2001).
32
These calculations assume that the risk reductions would last 45 years. Patassini et al. suggest that
excavation and removal of the contaminated soil affords a 95% risk reduction. This would imply benefits
for €49 million, whereas the costs of the remedy is €45 million.
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cost about €5 million, results in positive net benefits even for 20% reductions from the
baseline risk, and even if we assume that the lifetime of the cap is only 10 years.33
Caution should be used in interpreting our results, however, because they are
based on one operating unit, and the Marghera NPL site is comprised of many operating
units. In addition, our estimates do not include other benefits of cleanup, such as benefits
to ecological system, other economic benefits from the redevelopment of the area, etc.
The results from our study can also be used to cast some light on the issue of reuse of contaminated sites, which is an important goal of current policies and programs
(US GAO, 1995, 1997b). For industrial and commercial use, cleanup targets are often
allowed to be less stringent than for residential use. This may in turn imply that cleanup
is completed earlier. The discount rate estimated in this study suggests that to get the risk
reduction sooner, people would be willing to settle for a smaller risk reduction. Suppose
cleanup delivers an annual risk reduction of 10 in a million for 10 years beginning 10
years from now. To bring these risk reductions forward to 2 years from now, people
would be willing to settle for an annual risk reduction of 5.53 in a million.
Likewise, to get the risk reduction sooner, people would be willing to accept less
permanence. Consider for example an annual risk reduction of 10 in a million to begin in
10 years and continue for 30 years. To bring the risk reductions forward to 2 years from
now, people would be willing to settle for a remedy that lasts 9.25 years. These are
intriguing implications of the preferences elicited through our approach, which we hope
to explore more explicitly in future research.
33

These calculations sound a common theme with those in Gayer et al (2000), who report that their upper
bound measure of welfare benefits of $10.1 million for reducing cancer risks is smaller than the EPA’s
estimated total costs of remediation for the areas of investigation ($56.8 million). By contrast, less
permanent measures such as fencing and deed restrictions cost about $5.4 million and result in positive net
benefits.
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Appendix A. Example of a conjoint choice question.
Public Programs

Recall, every year
243 persone su 1.000.000 di abitanti
⎛ 243 ⎞
⎜
⎟
⎝ 1.000.000 ⎠
die in Italy for causes due to exposure to contaminants
at contaminated sites

The table below shows two government programs, A e B, addressing contaminated sites. These
programs are guaranteed to be effective and to save lives.
As you can see, each program has different effects and saves a different number of lives. Please
choose the one you prefer.

Program features
Number of lives saved every year in
1,000,000 people

Population: the number of people living
in the areas with the targeted
contaminated sites
Delay: the number of years before the
risk reduction begins
One-time tax payment: amount of tax
household will have to pay for the
remediation program
Duration: number of years over which
lives are saved

Program A

Program B

10 in 1.000.000

10 in 1.000.000

10
⎛
⎞
⎜
⎟
1
.
000
.
000
⎝
⎠

10
⎛
⎞
⎜
⎟
1
.
000
.
000
⎝
⎠

1,000,000

2,000,000

2 years

2 years

50 euro

100 euro

20 years

20 years

16. Which program would you choose between A e B?
A
B
17. If you could choose between A, B e neither program, which would you choose?
A
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Appendix B. Comparison between the sample and the population.

Table B.1 Education

Bari
Milan
Naples
Venice
sample population sample population samplepopulation sample population
Elementary
school
5,00
Completed middle
school/junior high 42,00
High
school
diploma
47,00
College or higher 11,00

19,68

1,49

10,46

9,50

21,79

27,43

26,37

27,08

36,50 29,50

31,98
16,88

60,69
11,45

37,50
23,34

42,50 28,77
11,50 15,28

6,90

18,00

total
total Italian
sample population

5,72

19,60

20,69 31,87

31,34

34,31

47,70 34,10
24,63 14,74

49,51
13,43

32,08
10,95

Table B.2 Average after-tax household income (€/yr)
Population
(2004)
Northern
Italy
Southern
Italy
Italy

Sample

33,376

31,905

21,463
29,483

21,612
26,784

males
females

32,200
23,204

28,088
25,442

up to 30
years
31-40
41-50
51-65

29,821
30,213
33,810
35,187

24,860
24,053
29,372
26,760
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Appendix C. Simple conditional logit model of the responses.
Delay=2 years. Log likelihood = -2600

deltarisk
popul
duration
costperyear

coefficient
37559
4.48E-08
0.006795
-0.0262

t
statistic
8.96
0.85
2.54
-8.49

Delay=10 years. Log likelihood = -2769

deltarisk
popul
duration
costperyear

coefficient
37327
-1.42E-07
0.000373
-0.0174

t
statistic
9.2
-2.75
0.15
-5.76

Appendix D. Delta method.

For large samples and assuming that the model is correctly specified, the
maximum likelihood estimates from the conditional logit are normally distributed around
the true vector of parameters, and the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix, Ω, is the
inverse of the Fisher information matrix. If we assume for simplicity that the indirect
utility is that of equation (2), the VSL is computed as:
VSL =

(A.1)

αˆ
βˆ

.

We use the delta method to produce the variance around the VSL (equation
(A.1)):
(A.2)

Var (WTP) = ∆g ′Ω∆g ,

where Ω is the variance-covariance matrix of the logit coefficients, and ∆g is equal to
⎡ 1/ β ⎤
⎢− α / β 2 ⎥ .
⎦
⎣

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper16

48

Alberini et al.: Paying for Permanence: Public Preferences for Contaminated S

NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series
Our Note di Lavoro are available on the Internet at the following addresses:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.html
http://www.ssrn.com/link/feem.html
http://www.repec.org
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu

NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2006
SIEV

1.2006

CCMP

2.2006

CCMP
KTHC

3.2006
4.2006

SIEV

5.2006

CCMP

6.2006

PRCG
SIEV
CTN
CTN
NRM

7.2006
8.2006
9.2006
10.2006
11.2006

NRM

12.2006

CCMP
KTHC
KTHC
CSRM

13.2006
14.2006
15.2006
16.2006

CCMP

17.2006

IEM
CTN

18.2006
19.2006

CCMP

20.2006

SIEV

21.2006

CCMP

22.2006

NRM

23.2006

NRM

24.2006

SIEV

25.2006

SIEV

26.2006

KTHC

27.2006

CCMP

28.2006

IEM

29.2006

KTHC
ETA

30.2006
31.2006

IEM

32.2006

NRM

33.2006

CTN

34.2006

IEM
ETA

35.2006
36.2006

Anna ALBERINI: Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in Voluntary Cleanup Programs:
The Case of Colorado
Valentina BOSETTI, Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Stabilisation Targets, Technical Change and the
Macroeconomic Costs of Climate Change Control
Roberto ROSON: Introducing Imperfect Competition in CGE Models: Technical Aspects and Implications
Sergio VERGALLI: The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics
Fabio GRAZI, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH and Piet RIETVELD: Modeling Spatial Sustainability: Spatial
Welfare Economics versus Ecological Footprint
Olivier DESCHENES and Michael GREENSTONE: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from
Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather
Michele MORETTO and Paola VALBONESE: Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach
Anna ALBERINI and Aline CHIABAI: Discount Rates in Risk v. Money and Money v. Money Tradeoffs
Jon X. EGUIA: United We Vote
Shao CHIN SUNG and Dinko DIMITRO: A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games
Fabio CERINA (lxxviii): Tourism Specialization and Sustainability: A Long-Run Policy Analysis
Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxxviii): Benchmarking in Tourism
Destination, Keeping in Mind the Sustainable Paradigm
Jens HORBACH: Determinants of Environmental Innovation – New Evidence from German Panel Data Sources
Fabio SABATINI: Social Capital, Public Spending and the Quality of Economic Development: The Case of Italy
Fabio SABATINI: The Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Perspective
Giuseppe DI VITA: Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence
Rob B. DELLINK and Marjan W. HOFKES: The Timing of National Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions in
the Presence of Other Environmental Policies
Philippe QUIRION: Distributional Impacts of Energy-Efficiency Certificates Vs. Taxes and Standards
Somdeb LAHIRI: A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems
Massimiliano MAZZANTI and Roberto ZOBOLI: Examining the Factors Influencing Environmental
Innovations
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: Non-pecuniary Work Incentive and Labor Supply
Marzio GALEOTTI, Matteo MANERA and Alessandro LANZA: On the Robustness of Robustness Checks of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: When is it Optimal to Exhaust a Resource in a Finite Time?
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: Non-pecuniary Value of Employment and Natural Resource
Extinction
Lucia VERGANO and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: Analysis and Evaluation of Ecosystem Resilience: An Economic
Perspective
Danny CAMPBELL, W. George HUTCHINSON and Riccardo SCARPA: Using Discrete Choice Experiments to
Derive Individual-Specific WTP Estimates for Landscape Improvements under Agri-Environmental Schemes
Evidence from the Rural Environment Protection Scheme in Ireland
Vincent M. OTTO, Timo KUOSMANEN and Ekko C. van IERLAND: Estimating Feedback Effect in Technical
Change: A Frontier Approach
Giovanni BELLA: Uniqueness and Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Model with Polluting Emissions
Alessandro COLOGNI and Matteo MANERA: The Asymmetric Effects of Oil Shocks on Output Growth: A
Markov-Switching Analysis for the G-7 Countries
Fabio SABATINI: Social Capital and Labour Productivity in Italy
Andrea GALLICE (lxxix): Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret
Andrea BIGANO and Paul SHEEHAN: Assessing the Risk of Oil Spills in the Mediterranean: the Case of the
Route from the Black Sea to Italy
Rinaldo BRAU and Davide CAO (lxxviii): Uncovering the Macrostructure of Tourists’ Preferences. A Choice
Experiment Analysis of Tourism Demand to Sardinia
Parkash CHANDER and Henry TULKENS: Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International
Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion
Valeria COSTANTINI and Salvatore MONNI: Environment, Human Development and Economic Growth
Ariel RUBINSTEIN (lxxix): Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

49

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 16 [2006]

ETA

37.2006

ETA

38.2006

ETA

39.2006

CCMP

40.2006

IEM

41.2006

CCMP

42.2006

KTHC

43.2006

CCMP

44.2006

SIEV

45.2006

NRM

46.2006

KTHC

47.2006

KTHC

48.2006

KTHC

49.2006

KTHC

50.2006

KTHC

51.2006

KTHC

52.2006

KTHC
KTHC

53.2006
54.2006

KTHC

55.2006

KTHC

56.2006

KTHC

57.2006

KTHC
KTHC

58.2006
59.2006

KTHC

60.2006

KTHC

61.2006

KTHC

62.2006

KTHC

63.2006

KTHC

64.2006

KTHC

65.2006

KTHC

66.2006

KTHC

67.2006

KTHC

68.2006

KTHC

69.2006

KTHC

70.2006

ETA

71.2006

CTN

72.2006

CTN

73.2006

CTN
CTN
CTN

74.2006
75.2006
76.2006

CTN

77.2006

CTN
CTN

78.2006
79.2006

Maria SALGADO (lxxix): Choosing to Have Less Choice
Justina A.V. FISCHER and Benno TORGLER: Does Envy Destroy Social Fundamentals? The Impact of Relative
Income Position on Social Capital
Benno TORGLER, Sascha L. SCHMIDT and Bruno S. FREY: Relative Income Position and Performance: An
Empirical Panel Analysis
Alberto GAGO, Xavier LABANDEIRA, Fidel PICOS And Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Taxing Tourism In Spain:
Results and Recommendations
Karl van BIERVLIET, Dirk Le ROY and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: An Accidental Oil Spill Along the Belgian
Coast: Results from a CV Study
Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Endogenous Technology and Tradable Emission Quotas
Giulio CAINELLI and Donato IACOBUCCI: The Role of Agglomeration and Technology in Shaping Firm
Strategy and Organization
Alvaro CALZADILLA, Francesco PAULI and Roberto ROSON: Climate Change and Extreme Events: An
Assessment of Economic Implications
M.E. KRAGT, P.C. ROEBELING and A. RUIJS: Effects of Great Barrier Reef Degradation on Recreational
Demand: A Contingent Behaviour Approach
C. GIUPPONI, R. CAMERA, A. FASSIO, A. LASUT, J. MYSIAK and A. SGOBBI: Network Analysis, Creative
System Modelling and DecisionSupport: The NetSyMoD Approach
Walter F. LALICH (lxxx): Measurement and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in
Sydney
Elena PASPALANOVA (lxxx): Cultural Diversity Determining the Memory of a Controversial Social Event
Ugo GASPARINO, Barbara DEL CORPO and Dino PINELLI (lxxx): Perceived Diversity of Complex
Environmental Systems: Multidimensional Measurement and Synthetic Indicators
Aleksandra HAUKE (lxxx): Impact of Cultural Differences on Knowledge Transfer in British, Hungarian and
Polish Enterprises
Katherine MARQUAND FORSYTH and Vanja M. K. STENIUS (lxxx): The Challenges of Data Comparison and
Varied European Concepts of Diversity
Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxxx): Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and
Evidence from the U.S.
Monica BARNI (lxxx): From Statistical to Geolinguistic Data: Mapping and Measuring Linguistic Diversity
Lucia TAJOLI and Lucia DE BENEDICTIS (lxxx): Economic Integration and Similarity in Trade Structures
Suzanna CHAN (lxxx): “God’s Little Acre” and “Belfast Chinatown”: Diversity and Ethnic Place Identity in
Belfast
Diana PETKOVA (lxxx): Cultural Diversity in People’s Attitudes and Perceptions
John J. BETANCUR (lxxx): From Outsiders to On-Paper Equals to Cultural Curiosities? The Trajectory of
Diversity in the USA
Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxxx): Cultural Diversity A Glimpse Over the Current Debate in Sweden
Emilio GREGORI (lxxx): Indicators of Migrants’ Socio-Professional Integration
Christa-Maria LERM HAYES (lxxx): Unity in Diversity Through Art? Joseph Beuys’ Models of Cultural
Dialogue
Sara VERTOMMEN and Albert MARTENS (lxxx): Ethnic Minorities Rewarded: Ethnostratification on the Wage
Market in Belgium
Nicola GENOVESE and Maria Grazia LA SPADA (lxxx): Diversity and Pluralism: An Economist's View
Carla BAGNA (lxxx): Italian Schools and New Linguistic Minorities: Nationality Vs. Plurilingualism. Which
Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?
Vedran OMANOVIĆ (lxxx): Understanding “Diversity in Organizations” Paradigmatically and Methodologically
Mila PASPALANOVA (lxxx): Identifying and Assessing the Development of Populations of Undocumented
Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels
Roberto ALZETTA (lxxx): Diversities in Diversity: Exploring Moroccan Migrants’ Livelihood in Genoa
Monika SEDENKOVA and Jiri HORAK (lxxx): Multivariate and Multicriteria Evaluation of Labour Market
Situation
Dirk JACOBS and Andrea REA (lxxx): Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in
The Netherlands and Belgium
Eric M. USLANER (lxxx): Does Diversity Drive Down Trust?
Paula MOTA SANTOS and João BORGES DE SOUSA (lxxx): Visibility & Invisibility of Communities in Urban
Systems
Rinaldo BRAU and Matteo LIPPI BRUNI: Eliciting the Demand for Long Term Care Coverage: A Discrete
Choice Modelling Analysis
Dinko DIMITROV and Claus-JOCHEN HAAKE: Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
Ottorino CHILLEM, Benedetto GUI and Lorenzo ROCCO: On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions
Under Adverse Selection
Sylvain BEAL and Nicolas QUÉROU: Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation
Sophie BADE, Guillaume HAERINGER and Ludovic RENOU: Bilateral Commitment
Andranik TANGIAN: Evaluation of Parties and Coalitions After Parliamentary Elections
Rudolf BERGHAMMER, Agnieszka RUSINOWSKA and Harrie de SWART: Applications of Relations and
Graphs to Coalition Formation
Paolo PIN: Eight Degrees of Separation
Roland AMANN and Thomas GALL: How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper16

50

Alberini et al.: Paying for Permanence: Public Preferences for Contaminated S

CTN
CCMP

80.2006
81.2006

CSRM

82.2006

CTN

83.2006

PRCG

84.2006

CCMP

85.2006

CCMP

86.2006

KTHC

87.2006

CCMP

88.2006

CCMP

89.2006

SIEV

90.2006

PRCG
CCMP

91.2006
92.2006

CCMP

93.2006

CCMP

94.2006

CCMP

95.2006

CCMP

96.2006

KTHC

97.2006

CCMP

98.2006

PRCG

99.2006

NRM

100.2006

NRM

101.2006

CCMP

102.2006

KTHC

103.2006

SIEV

104.2006

NRM

105.2006

PRCG

106.2006

CCMP

107.2006

NRM

108.2006

PRCG
KTHC
KTHC

109.2006
110.2006
111.2006

IEM

112.2006

SIEV

113.2006

Maria MONTERO: Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity
Vincent M. OTTO, Andreas LÖSCHEL and John REILLY: Directed Technical Change and Climate Policy
Nicoletta FERRO: Riding the Waves of Reforms in Corporate Law, an Overview of Recent Improvements in
Italian Corporate Codes of Conduct
Siddhartha BANDYOPADHYAY and Mandar OAK: Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary
Democracy
Raphaël SOUBEYRAN: Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate
Choose an Extremist Position?
Eduardo L. GIMÉNEZ and Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Pigou’s Dividend versus Ramsey’s Dividend in the Double
Dividend Literature
Andrea BIGANO, Jacqueline M. HAMILTON and Richard S.J. TOL: The Impact of Climate Change on
Domestic and International Tourism: A Simulation Study
Fabio SABATINI: Educational Qualification, Work Status and Entrepreneurship in Italy an Exploratory Analysis
Richard S.J. TOL: The Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: An Application of
Fund
Philippe TULKENS and Henry TULKENS: The White House and The Kyoto Protocol: Double Standards on
Uncertainties and Their Consequences
Andrea M. LEITER and Gerald J. PRUCKNER: Proportionality of Willingness to Pay to Small Risk Changes –
The Impact of Attitudinal Factors in Scope Tests
Raphäel SOUBEYRAN: When Inertia Generates Political Cycles
Alireza NAGHAVI: Can R&D-Inducing Green Tariffs Replace International Environmental Regulations?
Xavier PAUTREL: Reconsidering The Impact of Environment on Long-Run Growth When Pollution Influences
Health and Agents Have Finite-Lifetime
Corrado Di MARIA and Edwin van der WERF: Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with
Directed Technical Change
Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Chiara M. TRAVISI: Comparing Tax and Tax Reallocations Payments in Financing
Rail Noise Abatement Programs: Results from a CE valuation study in Italy
Timo KUOSMANEN and Mika KORTELAINEN: Valuing Environmental Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis Using
Data Envelopment Analysis
Dermot LEAHY and Alireza NAGHAVI: Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI vs.
Joint Ventures
Inmaculada MARTÍNEZ-ZARZOSO, Aurelia BENGOCHEA-MORANCHO and Rafael MORALES LAGE: The
Impact of Population on CO2 Emissions: Evidence from European Countries
Alberto CAVALIERE and Simona SCABROSETTI: Privatization and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to
Political Economy
Khaled ABU-ZEID and Sameh AFIFI: Multi-Sectoral Uses of Water & Approaches to DSS in Water
Management in the NOSTRUM Partner Countries of the Mediterranean
Carlo GIUPPONI, Jaroslav MYSIAK and Jacopo CRIMI: Participatory Approach in Decision Making Processes
for Water Resources Management in the Mediterranean Basin
Kerstin RONNEBERGER, Maria BERRITTELLA, Francesco BOSELLO and Richard S.J. TOL: Klum@Gtap:
Introducing Biophysical Aspects of Land-Use Decisions Into a General Equilibrium Model A Coupling
Experiment
Avner BEN-NER, Brian P. McCALL, Massoud STEPHANE, and Hua WANG: Identity and Self-Other
Differentiation in Work and Giving Behaviors: Experimental Evidence
Aline CHIABAI and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: Economic Valuation of Oceanographic Forecasting Services: A CostBenefit Exercise
Paola MINOIA and Anna BRUSAROSCO: Water Infrastructures Facing Sustainable Development Challenges:
Integrated Evaluation of Impacts of Dams on Regional Development in Morocco
Carmine GUERRIERO: Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and
Evidence
Richard S.J. TOL, Stephen W. PACALA and Robert SOCOLOW: Understanding Long-Term Energy Use and
Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Usa
Carles MANERA and Jaume GARAU TABERNER: The Recent Evolution and Impact of Tourism in the
Mediterranean: The Case of Island Regions, 1990-2002
Carmine GUERRIERO: Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence
John FOOT (lxxx): Mapping Diversity in Milan. Historical Approaches to Urban Immigration
Donatella CALABI: Foreigners and the City: An Historiographical Exploration for the Early Modern Period
Andrea BIGANO, Francesco BOSELLO and Giuseppe MARANO: Energy Demand and Temperature: A
Dynamic Panel Analysis
Anna ALBERINI, Stefania TONIN, Margherita TURVANI and Aline CHIABAI: Paying for Permanence: Public
Preferences for Contaminated Site Cleanup

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

51

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 16 [2006]

(lxxviii) This paper was presented at the Second International Conference on "Tourism and Sustainable
Economic Development - Macro and Micro Economic Issues" jointly organised by CRENoS (Università
di Cagliari and Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, and supported by the World Bank,
Chia, Italy, 16-17 September 2005.
(lxxix) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Economic Theory and Experimental
Economics" jointly organised by SET (Center for advanced Studies in Economic Theory, University of
Milano-Bicocca) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, Milan, 20-23 November 2005. The Workshop
was co-sponsored by CISEPS (Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics and Social Sciences,
University of Milan-Bicocca).
(lxxx) This paper was presented at the First EURODIV Conference “Understanding diversity: Mapping
and measuring”, held in Milan on 26-27 January 2006 and supported by the Marie Curie Series of
Conferences “Cultural Diversity in Europe: a Series of Conferences.

2006 SERIES
CCMP

Climate Change Modelling and Policy (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )

SIEV

Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)

NRM

Natural Resources Management (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)

KTHC

Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)

IEM

International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera)

CSRM

Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli)

PRCG

Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)

ETA

Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)

CTN

Coalition Theory Network

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper16

52

